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Politicisation, Law and Rights in the Transnational Counter-Terrorism Space: 
Indications from the Regulation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
 
Fiona de Londras
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Abstract 
Since 2001 a transnational counter-terrorism space has emerged that is vast in its scale 
and ambition and which can be discerned at both ‘universal’ (i.e. United Nations) and 
regional (e.g. European Union) levels, as well as in other formal and informal 
international organisations (for example the G7 and the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Forum). This article explores the question of politicisation within that transnational 
counter-terrorism space, and the potential for meaningful politicisation in respect of 
initiatives and measures emanating from transnational processes. Taking the example 
of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ it argues that a shift in arena to the transnational counter-
terrorism space has fundamentally challenged the capacity for effective and 
meaningful politicisation; that the transnational counter-terrorism space can be 
depoliticised by design, that where this happens the domestic counter-terrorism space 
is depoliticised by implication, and that the legal benefits of politicisation may thus be 
lost to the detriment of rights, legality and accountability.  
 
Keywords 
Transnational counter-terrorism – foreign terrorist fighters – human rights – EU 
counter terrorism – UN Security Council  
 
Introduction 
 
Although “politicisation” is a term better known to political science and international 
relations than to law, what it captures—namely, “growing controversy, political 
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activity, and [the involvement of] a range of actors”2 in debating contentious issues—
is of clear relevance to questions about how law relating to security and counter-
terrorism is shaped, made, applied, and debated. Indeed, while the term may not be 
widely used in law, the kind of analysis that it prompts one to engage in is not unusual 
for lawyers. After all, it is in the fundamental nature of the legal and constitutional 
milieu that politics and law are difficult to separate and mutually reinforcing,
3
 and that 
processes of making law—and especially of who gets to be part of the process of law-
making, and of how politics (formal and informal) determines those questions of in- 
and ex-clusion—are rightly questions to which we as lawyers ought to attend.  
 
Furthermore, while politics and political will often pose clear challenges to law, they 
are also vital to ensuring lawfulness itself. Generally speaking, parliaments and 
executive branches recognise and take seriously their place and role in the 
constitutionalist ecosystem
4
 as the key entities engaged in identifying and remaining 
within the boundaries of lawfully permissible action. While the judicial role within 
that ecosystem receives plentiful scholarly attention, it is parliaments, executives and 
bureaucracies that are engaged in the everyday constitutional labour of contesting, 
determining, and maintaining constitutionalism.
5
  
 
Conventional wisdom across both law and political science suggests that this critical 
political engagement with questions of law and legality loses a significant part of its 
effectiveness in the context of highly contentious, politically anxious issues such as 
security and counter-terrorism. In these contexts executive and specialist will may 
coalesce with popular concern to demand the expansion of the state’s reach and a 
dilution on its limitations,
6
 at least in the relatively short-term aftermath of a critical 
event such as a terrorist attack. For lawyers, and especially for constitutional and 
human rights lawyers, the decline in contestation and debate in those circumstances, 
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and the resultant decline in the quality of politicisation from a legal perspective, is a 
matter of grave concern. In particular, it raises questions about what happens to rights 
and the rights-based limitations on state power and security action when these spaces 
for repressive state action open up, commonly understood as a failure of ‘the political’ 
to ‘do its bit’ in maintaining ‘the legal’.7 
 
In recent years there have been indications of a political willingness to step in and 
‘de-exceptionalise’ some of areas of security,8 or at least to expose them to discussion 
and perhaps to ex post facto political or independent review.
9
 However, repressive 
consensus in the field of counter-terrorism persists; as our recent study of successive 
Conservative and Labour governments in the UK shows, for example, core 
commitments such as prevention and human rights exceptionalism are shared across 
these parties in spite of their apparent political disagreement on the role and nature of 
state power in a general sense.
10
 From a lawyer’s perspective this raises serious 
questions about the impact of apparent re-politicisation on the material question of the 
quality of the law. Similarly, courts have at least sometimes appeared to push back 
against repressive counter-terrorism laws and powers, albeit often modestly and 
sometimes ineffectively.
11
  
 
However, the story of de- and re-politicisation in security and counter-terrorism tends 
largely to focus on national contexts. This is understandable. Conventionally most 
counter-terrorism takes place at the national level; security is jealously guarded as a 
space of sovereign action, and even today international mechanisms have failed to 
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reach a basic definitional consensus around ‘terrorism’ that is necessary before we 
can conclude any general, binding international legal instruments on terrorism.
12
 
 
Over recent years, however, considerable parts of counter-terrorism law- and policy-
making have moved out of the domestic sphere. A transnational counter-terrorism 
space has emerged that is vast in its scale and ambition and which can be discerned at 
both ‘universal’ (i.e. United Nations) and regional (e.g. European Union) levels, as 
well as in other formal and informal international organisations (for example the G7 
and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum). This article explores the question of 
politicisation within that transnational counter-terrorism space, and the potential for 
meaningful politicisation in respect of initiatives and measures emanating from 
transnational processes. Taking the example of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ I will argue 
that the shift in arena to the transnational counter-terrorism space has fundamentally 
challenged the capacity for effective and meaningful politicisation; that the 
transnational counter-terrorism space can be depoliticised by design, that the domestic 
counter-terrorism space is depoliticised by implication, and that the legal benefits of 
politicisation may thus be lost, with detrimental impacts on rights, legality and 
accountability.  
 
Importantly, my claim here is not that transnationalism in counter-terrorism will 
always or inevitably result in depoliticisation and a resultant negative impact on 
rights, legality and accountability. Certainly, one may be able to suggest areas where 
this was arguably not the case.
13
 However, what the example that I pursue here does 
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establish is that, through shifting counter-terrorism decision-, policy-, and law-making 
activities into the transnational space, states have created for themselves the capacity 
to depoliticise, to reduce contestation, to shut out rights-based perspectives, and to 
evade accountability. If this is so, then transnational counter-terrorism poses a serious 
and a clear challenge to the rule of law, not merely in substantive terms (‘what does 
the law originated at transnational level do to legally protected rights?’) but more 
importantly in conceptual and institutional terms (‘is this law effectively limited by 
fundamental legal principles such as human rights, legality and proportionality?’).  
 
A manoeuvre that allows states to create and operate in a depoliticised zone of law-
making activity and, thus, to decide for themselves when and to what extent they will 
limit their activities by reference to human rights law is a manoeuvre that severely 
challenges the rule of law. States cannot pick and choose when the law will limit their 
actions; to do so is to undermine the very idea of law itself. Transnational counter-
terrorism has the tendency to do precisely that. 
 
Sketching the Transnational Counter-Terrorism Space  
 
The international legal regime could be said only to have been marginally concerned 
with countering terrorism prior to September 2001. There was no counter-terrorism 
law at European Union level,
14
 and while there were a number of specialist 
international law treaties on terrorism in particular contexts
15
 (e.g. hijacking of 
aircraft), no general international legal treaties or Chapter VII resolutions of the 
Security Council imposing legal duties on states to introduce domestic counter-
terrorism laws states existed. Where states were confronted with terrorist violence it 
was largely dealt with through domestic laws and policies. International institutions 
such as the European Court of Human Rights occasionally found themselves dealing 
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with the international legal implications of counter-terrorism,
16
 but it was not a matter 
of general international legal concern.
17
 
 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 changed this. Not only did the United Nations,
18
 
European Union
19
 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
20
 take near-immediate and 
unprecedented legal steps in response, but a new institutional infrastructure of 
transnational counter-terrorism began rapidly to emerge.  
 
At the United Nations, the Security Council almost immediately established the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee,
21
 which was then given heightened capacity through 
its dedicated Executive Directorate.
22
 A few years later the Secretary-General 
established the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
23
 and the General 
Assembly endorsed the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,24 which is reviewed 
every two years. In 2017 the General Assembly established the UN Office of 
Counter-Terrorism.
25
 Across all of these entities what Fionnuala ní Aoláin, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, calls an “under-appreciated” 
“scale of norm creation” has taken place.26 Ní Aoláin argues (and I agree) that this 
poses specific challenges to “special and global compliance of wide-ranging counter-
terrorism regulation across multiple and new spheres with human rights standards”.27 
The precise interactions of these norms and standards across the different parts of the 
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UN’s counter-terrorism infrastructure is not always entirely clear, and even less 
clear—and largely under-considered—is their interaction with other legal regimes in 
both international and domestic law. Indeed, this is so under-considered that ní Aoláin 
has deemed clarifying these interactions to be a priority of her tenure as Special 
Rapporteur.
28
 Within the United Nations context much counter-terrorism norm 
generation happens in what is effectively the Security Council, either through Chapter 
VII resolutions or through the Counter-Terrorism Committee. That Committee is 
itself a subsidiary body of the Security Council:
29
 the Council established it, and its 
membership is the 15 members of the UN Security Council.
30
 This is significant: not 
only is the Security Council’s work largely determined by the priorities and veto-
wielding of the five permanent members,
31
 but so too is it an institution with very 
limited membership and a capacity for speedy action that is unmatched across most of 
the rest of the international legal and organisational infrastructure. In this respect it 
is—as I have argued elsewhere—as close as one gets in international law in terms of 
structural capacity for reactive law- and policy-making to a domestic ‘executive’,32 
while having the ability to make binding law on all member states of the United 
Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter.
33
 In that respect, of course, it has a greater 
capacity for emergency norm generation than many domestic executive branches.
34
 
 
The transnational counter-terrorism space goes well beyond the United Nations, 
although, as will be demonstrated below, that is a key driver of activity across the 
space. It includes regional organisations as well. For our purposes I will focus here on 
two European regional organisations—the Council of Europe and the European 
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Union—although regional counter-terrorism law- and policy-making is certainly not 
unique to Europe.
35
  
 
The Council of Europe, with its 47 member states, is a significant regional 
organisation. Although it does not have equivalent constitutional and law-making 
capacities to the European Union (it cannot, for example, make directly effective law 
and its Court (the European Court of Human Rights) does not have constitutional 
supremacy in a manner analogous to the Court of Justice of the European Union), it 
has developed a counter-terrorism infrastructure that is noteworthy and impactful.  
 
In 2003 the Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) was established with 
a number of thematic foci. In addition to developing policies across these areas of 
focus, the Committee was tasked with developing country profiles of member states’ 
counter-terrorism laws and monitoring signature and ratification of core documents, 
especially the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted 
in 2005. That Convention was added to with an Additional Protocol in 2015 (which in 
turn entered into force in 2017). The CODEXTER also acted as an important focal 
point for cooperation with other transnational counter-terrorism actors, especially the 
Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (in the United Nations) and the 
European Union. In 2018 CODEXTER was changed to the Council of Europe 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has as a priority the development of a Council 
of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy for 2018-2022, although interestingly its 
website does not indicate a cooperative role across the transnational counter-terrorism 
space
36
 (in contrast to that of the CODEXTER
37
).  
 
Although it had no counter-terrorism laws on the morning of 11 September 2001, the 
European Union has since developed a very significant corpus of counter-terrorism 
law and policy.
38
 A mere ten days after the attacks, on 21 September 2001, an 
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extraordinary meeting of the European Council was held, after which a European 
policy and action plan to counter terrorism was released,
39
 emphasising everything 
from support for the development of international legal instruments and 
implementation of existing instruments, to the integration of counter-terrorism into 
the Common and Foreign Security Policy of the European Union. These first, core 
commitments were followed by an ‘Anti-Terrorism Road Map’, published on 26 
September 2001.
40
  
 
The Road Map outlined the measures to be taken in the EU, which broadly map onto 
the commitments in the Action Plan, including ratification of relevant international 
agreements, the development of EU measures relating to counter-terrorism and 
communications data, and the enlargement of Europol activities in the counter-
terrorism realm. In spite of the challenges posed by the scale of the Road Map’s 
ambition, much of this somewhat hectic
41
 programme has actually been implemented, 
and new elements added to it, through a process of hyperactive law and policy-
making at EU level.
42
  
 
Following the Madrid attacks the European Union adopted its Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy,
43
 which in turn led to the adoption of further strategies (such as EU Strategy 
for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment
44
), as well as measures focusing on 
border security,
45
 the protection of critical infrastructure,
46
 and enhancement of air 
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transport security.
47
 In and beyond that Strategy the focus at EU-level has largely 
been on coordination, the development of legal instruments, attending to borders, 
disrupting terrorist finances, and developing new European agencies and 
institutions.
48
 However, it was not until 2017 that the EU adopted a ‘hard’ omnibus 
legal instrument on counter-terrorism: the Directive on Combating Terrorism.
49
 It is 
to this, and more particularly to its provenance, that we will shortly turn. 
 
Lawyerly concern with the development of this transnational counter-terrorism space 
is not merely doctrinal (although, as this space has led to what ní Aoláin calls “an 
explosion of legal norms at various levels of legal capacity…at global, regional, 
national, and sub-national levels”,50 the doctrinal concern is significant). Returning to 
the observations about the relationship between politicisation, law and legality 
outlined in the introduction to this paper, a question emerges about the implications of 
arena shifting in counter-terrorism across geo-political scales to a bespoke and rapidly 
emerging transnational space.
51
 What are the implications of such a change in law- 
and policy-making location for politicisation and, resultantly, for the ability properly 
to ensure that implications for rights are accounted for and minimised in the making 
of counter-terrorism law and policy? To answer this question it is instructive to turn 
now to the question of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and to how recent legal manoeuvres 
in relation to tackling the security challenges they pose illustrate that the transnational 
counter-terrorism space operates in a manner that minimises politicisation. In short, I 
will argue that when legal obligations originate in that space there can be a reduction 
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in the issue’s salience and visibility to the public, and the range and diversity of actors 
involved can be (and is) limited, with necessary implications for politicisation.
52
 Far 
from shifting questions of counter-terrorism into more prominent public arenas,
53
 the 
shift to a transnational counter-terrorism space re-constructs exclusivity, secrecy and 
executive dominance and thus undermines politicisation, rights, and the rule of law.  
 
Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A Transnational Concern 
 
In recent years the phenomenon of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ has become a core 
concern in counter-terrorism. According to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 
foreign terrorist fighters are “individuals who travel to a State other than their States 
of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation 
of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist raining, 
including in connection with armed conflict”.54 The precise scale of the phenomenon 
is (understandably) difficult to ascertain, but estimates indicate that it is significant. 
For example, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that between 
2011 and 2017 something between 25,000-30,000 foreign terrorist fighters arrived in 
Syria and Iraq.
55
 By its very nature, the challenge of foreign terrorist fighters is one 
that lends itself to multilateral and transnational responses: these individuals cross 
borders in order to undertake the prohibited behaviours, and in doing so they 
necessarily engage international law. Similarly, the adaptive capacities of terrorist 
organisations
56
 suggest that unless there is at least some harmonisation of approaches 
across states, terrorist or putative terrorist actors might ‘forum shop’, focusing on 
states and borders that are relatively less regulated in respect of attempting to prevent 
the phenomenon than others.  
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It is of little surprise, then, that the phenomenon has attracted the attention of 
international law.
57
 In particular, in 2014, the Security Council passed Resolution 
2178 to address foreign terrorist fighters, requiring all member states of the United 
Nations to “ensure that any person who participates in…terrorist acts or in supporting 
terrorist acts is brought to justice” and to “ensure that…domestic laws and regulations 
establish serious criminal offences sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to 
penalize”58 such persons. In imposing that general obligation, Resolution 2178 was 
reinforcing the same injunction made very quickly after the 9/11 attacks in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373, but Resolution 2178 then specifies the measures to 
be taken in respect of foreign terrorist fighters in order to fulfil this general obligation.  
 
Resolution 2178 thus builds on and continues the pattern of legislative resolutions in 
the field of counter-terrorism that the Security Council began in 2001. Resolution 
1373 required states to put in place national laws and measures to prevent, criminalise 
and prosecute terrorism.
59
 That Resolution is highly controversial; it is the first time 
that the Security Council obliged states to pass particular criminal laws, and has been 
widely characterised as indicative of an inclination towards ‘legislation’ on the part of 
the Security Council.
60
 It is notable, then, that the Security Council took an analogous 
approach to foreign terrorist fighters in 2014 and, by so doing, “reaffirmed [1373’s] 
innovative extension of the Council’s powers, with all the advantages (speed, 
uniformity) and disadvantages (decreased political legitimacy, lack of state consent) 
that Council legislative decisions entail”.61 If, as Balzacq argues, both the agent and 
the act matter to politicisation,
62
 then the selection of the Security Council as the 
arena within the transnational counter-terrorism space in which to act on FTFs, and 
the nature of the Resolution as a legislative one are both significant.  
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 The Security Council is not a politicised space (using that word as a term of art), even 
though of course it is a highly political one. As a general matter there is little 
contestation, especially where something is proposed in the wake of an attack on one 
of the five veto-holding permanent members. There is no effective civil society 
participation, and almost no human rights due diligence in respect of proposed new 
measures.
63
 Speed rather than deliberation is the order of the day. This is all in 
evidence in respect of Resolution 2178. It was adopted unanimously, in a session 
chaired by President Barack Obama and addressed—in supportive terms—by the 
Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon. The Security Council meeting was convened at the 
urging of the United States of America and attended and addressed by representatives 
of states beyond the member states of the Council. At that time the non-permanent 
members of the Council were Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, Jordan, South Korea, Chile, 
Argentina, Australia, Luxembourg and Lithuania, but representatives of Turkey, 
Qatar, Bulgaria, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Canada, the Netherlands, Morocco, 
Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, India, Spain, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Belgium all also addressed the Council. So too did 
representatives of the European Union and the Holy Sea. Serbia, Pakistan, Algeria, 
Senegal, Latvia, Denmark, Albania, Estonia, Kazakhstan all sent ministerial level 
representation. There was, quite simply, an astounding amount of consensus. No state 
spoke against the proposal.
64
 No civil society consultation or participation was 
invited.  
 
Resolution 2178 had a rapid impact in Europe, and particularly in the Council of 
Europe. As already mentioned above, the Council of Europe does have a Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism, which was adopted in 2005. Like Resolution 1373, 
that created offences that member states were to ensure were present in domestic 
law.
65
 The European Union is a party to the Convention,
66
 as well as all of the 
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member states of the Council of Europe and the European Union themselves.
67
 In 
2014 the CODEXTER of the Council of Europe proposed the drafting of an 
Additional Protocol to the Convention in order to implement the criminal law 
provisions of Resolution 2178. A Committee on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and 
Related Issues was then established in January 2015, which in turn drafted and 
proposed the Additional Protocol, adding provisions on criminalising acts related to 
terrorist offences and on the exchange of information to the Convention itself. 
Significantly, travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism,
68
 funding travel abroad 
for the purpose of terrorism,
69
 and organising or facilitating travel abroad for the 
purposes of terrorism
70
 are all offences under the Additional Protocol. The Additional 
Protocol itself has been criticised by civil society for failing properly to take account 
of human rights or to engage effectively with civil society NGOs. As was the case 
with the EU’s Directive on Combating Terrorism, discussed further below, the 
drafting process was expedited, with civil society participation largely limited to an 
opportunity to provide comments on a draft published by the Committee on Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters and Related Issues.
71
 
 
It was in this context—following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2178 
and the conclusion of the Additional Protocol to a Convention to which the European 
Union was a party—that the inclusion of provisions on foreign terrorist fighters 
within a new EU directive on combating terrorism was undertaken. 
 
The EU Directive on Combating Terrorism  
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The Directive on Combating Terrorism, proposed by the European Commission on 2 
December 2015,
72
 is not merely a fresh piece of omnibus European counter-terrorism 
legislation. Rather, it amalgamates and adds to existing EU law (including the 2002 
Framework Decision, as amended
73
) drawing from other sources of transnational 
counter-terrorism—including Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism—for those additions as they relate to 
foreign terrorist fighters. 
 
There was, of course, an important European political provenance to the proposal for 
the Directive on Combating Terrorism, not least reactions to the attacks on Paris in 
November of 2015. In particular, there were three key ‘pre-proposal’ political events 
and accompanying documents that form a relevant part of the political provenance for 
the proposal of the Directive on Combating Terrorism: Council Conclusions of 13 
October 2014,
74
 the Joint Statement following the meeting between Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29-30 January 2015,
75
 and the European Parliament’s 
Resolution of 11 February 2015.
76
 These will now be discussed in greater detail. 
 
In its Conclusions of 13 October 2014, the Council called upon the Commission to 
explore ways to overcome possible shortcomings of the existing Framework Decision 
in light of, in particular, the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist 
fighters. In the Joint Statement after the Riga Justice and Home Affairs Council, EU 
Ministers agreed on the importance of considering possible legislative measures to 
establish a common understanding of terrorism offences in light of Security Council 
Resolution 2178. The European Parliament’s Resolution of 11 February 2015 finally 
noted that “the EU is facing a severe and growing threat posed by the so-called ‘EU 
foreign fighters’”77 and called for measures to be adopted “to disrupt the travel of 
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European and other foreign fighters and to deal with returnees”,78 and noted “the 
need…to harmonise criminalisation of foreign fighter-related offences across the 
EU”.79 In doing so, it referred expressly to Resolution 2178. At that time, then, there 
was consensus at a high political level in the European Union that European law 
needed better to address foreign terrorist fighters as envisioned in both Security 
Council and Council of Europe instruments.  
 
In legal terms this was achieved by the inclusion in the Directive on Combating 
Terrorism of foreign terrorist fighter offences.
80
 It is quite clear that the inclusion of 
these offences was a response to legal developments in the transnational counter-
terrorism space. The Explanatory Memorandum to the proposed Directive explicitly 
notes that the EU’s counter-terrorism acquis needed to be reviewed in order to 
implement new international obligations under Resolution 2178.
81
 So too the 
Explanatory Memorandum referred explicitly to the Council of Europe’s Additional 
Protocol,
82
 which—as outlined above—was itself implementing the obligations 
outlined in Resolution 2178. 
  
Thus, in order to give effective to both the EU’s obligations under the Additional 
Protocol and its member states’ obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 
2178, the Commission proposed a Directive that would include offences relating to 
receiving training for terrorism,
83
 travelling abroad for terrorism to any country, 
including a member state of the European Union,
84
 organising or otherwise 
facilitating travelling abroad for terrorism,
85
 and the financing of travelling abroad for 
terrorism.
86
 The Commission also proposed criminalising a number of additional, 
inchoate actions relating to FTFs.
87
  
 
The Making of the Directive on Combating Terrorism  
                                                        
78
 Ibid, para 4. 
79
 Ibid, para 26. 
80
 Especially Articles 9 and 10, Directive on Combating Terrorism.  
81
 European Commission, above n. 72, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 4. 
82
 Ibid, p. 5.  
83
 Proposed Article 8. 
84
 Proposed Article 9. 
85
 Proposed Article 10. 
86
 Proposed Article 11. 
87
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 Following ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, Directives are generally to be made 
according to the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) of the Union, under which the 
Council and Parliament of the Union have the same legislative weight, and the 
majority of EU laws are jointly adopted.
88
 The Directive on Combating Terrorism was 
purportedly passed under the OLP. Under the OLP the Commission submits a 
legislative proposal to the European Parliament, Council and national parliaments. 
The two co-legislators work in parallel, with the Parliament debating its agreed text 
and the Council its general approach more or less contemporaneously. During the 
examination of a proposal, the relevant parliamentary committee asks the 
Commission and the Council to keep it informed of the proposal’s progress under 
Rule 43(2). The two institutional texts are published in the public domain and the 
Council and the Parliament adopt a legislative proposal either at the first reading or at 
the second reading (following a trilogue negotiation phase). If the two institutions do 
not reach an agreement after the second reading then a conciliation committee is 
convened. If the text agreed by the conciliation committee is acceptable to both 
institutions at the third reading, the legislative act is adopted.
89
 In a number of 
interesting ways the passage of the Directive deviated from the usual progression of 
proposals under the OLP.  
 
First, and as already intimated, while the Commission did propose the Directive (thus 
taking the legislative initiative), this proposal was clearly influenced by the political 
catalysts prioritising the tackling of foreign terrorist fighters as outlined above.  
 
Secondly, the proposal was not preceded by the kind of consultation that is usually 
undertaken before the Commission initiates legislation. In the ordinary course of 
events such proposals result from extensive consultation including an ex ante impact 
assessment, reports by experts, consultation of national experts, international 
organisations and NGOs and consultation via Green and White Papers.
90
 Moreover, 
an inter-service consultation process is launched among the different Commission 
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departments in order to ensure that all aspects under consideration are taken into 
account. The proposal is then adopted by the College of Commissioners and 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. It is then submitted to 
Parliament, Council and all EU national parliaments where it is assessed on the basis 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
91
 The purpose of this process, and 
its usually robust nature, is to ensure “the highest possible quality” in all legislation,92 
with the various phases of consultation and preparation “provid[ing] a rigorous 
evidence base to inform decision-making and contribute to making Commission 
activities more effective, coherent, transparent and accountable”.93 
 
However, the Directive was not subjected to this ordinary scrutiny. In particular, there 
was no ex ante impact assessment at all; a development that causes particular rights-
based concern. Ordinarily an impact assessment is required when there is likely to be 
a significant economic, environmental, or societal impact of the measure.
94
 In EU 
parlance social impacts include impacts on legally protected rights. It is permissible to 
skip the impact assessment phase in limited circumstances, such as where the 
Commission is transposing an international agreement with no significant margin for 
variation.
95
 While one might consider that the relationship between the Directive, 
Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol thus justified the lack of an impact 
assessment, the Explanatory Memorandum explained it otherwise, stating: 
 
[T]he urgent need to improve the EU framework to increase security in the 
light of recent terrorist attacks including by incorporating international 
obligations and standards, [and therefore] this proposal is exceptionally 
presented without an impact assessment.
96
 
The recourse to urgency to justify the circumvention of ordinary law-making 
processes, of course, resonates across security and counter-terrorist contexts.  
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Thirdly, and related to the fact that no impact assessment took place, the Directive 
was not subjected to the analysis of scientific experts, consultants and stakeholders—
including civil society—as is usually the case. The Commission’s Better Regulation 
Toolbox recommends such engagement because “it helps to deliver higher quality and 
more credible proposals and gives greater transparency and legitimacy to the policy 
development process”.97  
 
In the absence of the impact assessment there was no such engagement with experts, 
or with civil society. Instead of being brought into the process through the legislative 
process and structure, civil society groups with concerns about the human rights 
implications of the Directive had to try to penetrate the process from the outside. In 
February 2016, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 
the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Open Society European Policy Institute 
published a joint statement detailing concerns arising from a close reading of the 
proposed Directive and recommending substantive changes to ensure better alignment 
with international human rights law.
98
 The statement refers to concerns previously 
expressed with both the Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol and Security 
Council Resolution 2178,
99
 both of which it was said had been passed following 
expedited and non-transparent policy processes with serious implications for public 
scrutiny, debate and input from relevant sectors of civil society. As a result, they 
cautioned against the transposition of Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol 
arguing that they both “contain flaws that give rise to the potential to result in 
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arbitrary, disproportionate and discriminatory interference with human rights, and to 
conflict with international humanitarian law and international criminal law, where 
applicable. These problems”, they argued, were “also reflected, and in some cases 
exacerbated in the text of the proposed Directive”.100 In the absence of any structured 
engagement with civil society, however, this clear form of contestation—central to 
politicisation—was essentially excluded from the law-making process around the 
Directive. 
 
Fourthly, the Council took a somewhat unusual approach to its engagement with the 
proposed Directive. Following formal adoption by the Council and European 
Parliament in December 2015, the proposed Directive was discussed by the Council’s 
Working Party on Substantive Criminal Law known as DROIPEN, which was to 
establish the Council’s general approach to the proposal for the basis of subsequent 
negotiation with the Parliament. On a number of occasions, DROIPEN met in a 
‘Friends of the Presidency’ formation to consider the proposed Directive and prepare 
draft conclusions as a basis for further discussion among the Member States.
101
 This 
is an interesting and unusual step within a legislative process. Friends of the 
Presidency groups are ad hoc, subject-specific groups convened at the invitation of 
the Presidency and comprised of political advisors and legal experts from the Member 
States and the European institutions.
102
 It would appear that the draft Directive was 
discussed at least eight times at the Friends of the Presidency Group established to 
consider it
103
 and, perhaps more interestingly, that this Group was in effect precisely 
the same in composition as the DROIPEN but reconstituted for the purpose of 
completing the Council’s business quickly as no interpretation is needed for such 
meetings.
104
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 Neither was dissensus, disagreement or dissent much in evidence in the European 
Parliament’s engagement with the proposed Directive. Under the OLP the President 
of the Parliament refers the proposal to the relevant parliamentary committee, which 
appoints a rapporteur from its membership who then guides the proposal through the 
various stages of the procedure, reporting progress to the responsible committee 
during the committee stage and then reporting to Parliament as a whole at the plenary 
stage of proceedings. Once a report is agreed in committee it is placed before the 
plenary Parliament for debate, and for simple majority votes on 1) amendments to the 
proposal, 2) the proposal and 3) amendments to the draft legislative resolution. 
Finally, Parliament votes on the draft legislative resolution as a whole. The Civil 
Liberties (LIBE) Committee was selected as the relevant committee to consider the 
proposed Directive, with Monika Hohlmeier having been appointed Rapporteur. 
LIBE’s final report on the proposed Directive was published on 4 July 2016. Ahead of 
the publication, LIBE convened an extraordinary meeting on 4 July to adopt the final 
report. There was little dissent, with 41 members voting in favour, 4 against, and 10 
abstentions.  
 
Once the Council and Parliament had reached their respective positions on the 
proposed Directive the trilogue stage commenced. Trilogues are important in law-
making processes. If agreement is reached on compromise amendments between 
Council and Parliament in the first reading trilogues then the amendments are 
formally passed by the respective parliamentary committee and passed to the plenary 
Parliament where a simple majority of MEPs in attendance can agree to the 
compromise. Although the process becomes more rigorous as the proposal moves 
through different readings (i.e. if early agreement is not reached), the reality is that the 
vast majority of measures are agreed at 1st reading and the rest at 2nd reading.
105
 
However, trilogues are extremely controversial within EU law. They are opaque by 
design, generally understood as “a trade-off in which speed is prioritized over 
                                                                                                                                                              
composition of capital based experts meeting in the Council Working Party on Substantive Criminal 
Law (DROIPEN), which is in charge of the negotiations of the Terrorism Directive. It involves mainly 
experts from the Ministries of Justice of the Member States. It appears that a Friends of Presidency 
formation of DROIPEN means in practice that interpretation is not available. For logistical reasons, 
this enables the Presidency to convene expert meetings in the Council as often, as needed” (email 
correspondence; 27 October 2016).  
105
 http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-205a-cleu.pdf  
inclusive decision making”,106 and pose real challenges to attempts to interrogate the 
process of developing, ratifying and implementing EU Directives. In the case of the 
proposed Directive substantive issues relating to ‘travelling’ (and thus to foreign 
terrorist fighters) in Article 9 remained after the third trilogue,
107
 and the Directive as 
a whole was not agreed until the seventh trilogue on 17 November 2016. However, 
given the nature of trilogues it is not clear whether it was substantive questions of the 
criminalisation of activities of foreign terrorist fighters, another substantive provision, 
or the vexed but technical question of the legal basis of the Directive that was the 
source of the disagreement reflected in the need for seven trilogues. 
 
The Implications of Transnational Counter-Terrorism for Politicisation: 
Suggestions from the Regulation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters  
 
The Directive is now part of European Union law, having been adopted in March 
2017.
108
 The nature of a Directive is that it is binding on the countries to which it is 
addressed.
109
 In other words, member states must transpose it into domestic law, 
although they have some flexibility as to the form and means of the transposition. The 
Directive on Combating Terrorism requires “Member States [to] bring into force the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this 
Directive by 8 September 2018”.110 This obligation is absolute: member states will be 
required to transpose the Directive and not even the (strong) resistance of civil society 
can get away from the fact that all member states are subject to this legal obligation, 
even if and where they went beyond what was considered necessary or desirable for 
the state in question. As a result, any politicisation that might be present at the 
domestic level could only be tepid and partially effective: no matter how much dissent 
or debate there is, the obligation on addressee member states to transpose the 
Directive remains, raising questions about whether committing resources to resisting 
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this transposition at domestic level would be a worthwhile exercise on the part of civil 
society. If this is the case, what might the development of a transnational counter-
terrorism space and the initiation within it of legal obligations of the kind illustrated 
here by the example of provisions relating to foreign terrorist fighters tell us about 
politicisation in the counter-terrorism context? 
 
First, this should call our attention to a wider process when we are considering the 
extent and the impact of politicisation in the context of counter-terrorism. A purely 
domestic analysis—or indeed an analysis of only one arena (such as the European 
Union)—simply may not be enough. Many counter-terrorism laws now have complex 
and transnational provenances, and that complexity calls into question the 
conventional wisdom about the making of counter-terrorism law. It has long been 
widely observed that counter-terrorism laws and policies are often devised and 
implemented following a ‘shock’ to the system that is perceived to require a legal 
and/or political response. Hence, the Birmingham Bombings led to the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 1974, the 9/11 attacks to the USA Patriot Act, and so on. However, 
following the growth of the transnational counter-terrorism space the narratives of 
contemporary counter-terrorism are far more complex than that, if indeed these 
relatively simplistic tellings of the growth of counter-terrorism law were ever accurate 
in the first place. While a shock may instigate a revision of, addition to, or extension 
of counter-terrorism law or policy, the law or policy that emerges may well be the 
product of a complex and non-linear set of events, policies, engagements, and 
activities, often led by actors that are not considered to be part of the ‘primary’ 
policy-making process within a particular (national or supranational) institutional 
setting. If we are properly to assess the extent and the quality of politicisation in 
counter-terrorism we must look to all of these layers—to all of these arenas of 
counter-terrorist activity—to assess how, why, and by whom the law is really being 
made. 
 
In the context of foreign terrorist fighters, we have seen here that the actions of the 
United Nations Security Council in passing Resolution 2178 are clearly a material 
part of the policy-making process that led to the Council of Europe’s Additional 
Protocol, then the European Union Directive on Combating Terrorism and, 
eventually, to domestic law transposing that Directive across the member states of the 
European Union. Assessing politicisation in the context of those transposing laws, for 
example, thus requires one to be at least attentive to wholly different processes and 
arenas: the making of Security Council Resolution 2178, the making of the Additional 
Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the 
making of the EU Directive on Combating Terrorism. The national political arena is, 
in this context, inextricably linked with these transnational arenas, which—as already 
shown—were, by design, depoliticised. The very nature of the Security Council is 
such that politicisation of this kind is difficult to achieve, and procedural decisions 
taken at the Council of Europe and, especially, within the European Union—to use a 
Friends of the Presidency Group formation, to skip the ex ante impact assessment, to 
eschew structured consultation with experts and civil society—were such that 
politicisation was made almost impossible. If, as outlined in the introduction to this 
paper, politicisation and its introduction of debate, dissent, contestation, participation, 
and openness really are important to ensure that essential questions of legality, 
proportionality and rights protection are aired so that political bodies play their part in 
ensuring legality and constitutionalism, then this manifestation of the transnational 
counter-terrorism space is of real and serious concern. 
 
The importance of recognising the complexity of the narrative leading to the 
Commission proposal of a Directive here cannot be overstated; this is not simply a 
matter of explaining why the process started, but also of understanding that at the 
outset of that process some elements of the policy were effectively pre-determined by 
what came before it.  
 
Even if there had been dissent and disagreement about whether criminal offences 
relating to foreign terrorist fighters were needed or desirable, this criminalisation was 
quite simply required by Resolution 2178 and by the Additional Protocol. The 
decision to give effect to this requirement through an EU Directive, rather than by 
each member state individually through self-started domestic law, meant that an arena 
was chosen and constructed in which opacity could be ensured (through trilogues, for 
example), in which civil society could be structurally excluded (through deciding not 
to have an ex ante impact assessment for reasons of urgency), and in which public 
participation and attention were minimised because of the democratic distance 
between the EU institutions and the polity and the relative lack of concerted media 
attention when compared to domestic counter-terrorism law making. Once the EU law 
had been passed in this depoliticised space, a legal obligation—enforceable by 
infringement actions taken by the Commission
111—arose so that the potential for 
meaningful politicisation in the domestic law making processes that inevitably follow 
the Directive’s passage was reduced.  
 
This illustrates very well the extent to which counter-terrorism law- and policy-
making is becoming increasingly international and transnational, and the impact of 
this on politicisation. This suggests that if politicisation is to happen in the process of 
passing laws with transnational provenance, then it must happen somewhere in the 
transnational counter-terrorism space; domestic politicisation will not be enough to 
undo any serious rights-infringements that result from the substantive provisions of 
the transnational law. But that space can be designed to minimise this, whether by 
focusing on Security Council activities or by structuring regional law-making 
processes to minimise it, as illustrated by this example. In such a context we become 
reliant to some extent on bureaucracy to provide the legal products we hope to 
achieve through politicisation: to ensure legality, to be attentive to rights, to assess 
proposals against constitutional tests such as the requirement that all interference with 
rights must be proportionate. However, notwithstanding the constitutional 
commitment to legality and proportionality within the European Union, the 
transnationalism of the provisions’ provenance impacts on this too. This is evident 
from the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the proposal for the 
Directive.
112
  
 
In that memorandum the Commission engaged to some extent with how the proposed 
Directive might impact on rights and freedoms, concerning itself in particular with 
freedom of movement and freedom of association in respect of the foreign terrorist 
fighter provisions. Due mention is made of the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (and reflected in Article 6(1) of the Treaty of 
the European Union), and it acknowledges the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States including the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The memorandum thus correctly notes that “all 
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measures intended to enhance security measures must comply with the principles of 
necessity, proportionality and legality, with appropriate safeguards to ensure 
accountability and judicial redress”.113 The Commission also states that any limitation 
on rights “is subject to the principle of proportionality with respect to the legitimate 
aim of genuinely meeting objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, be provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms”.114  
 
However, with one exception, nowhere in the memorandum can one find any 
explanation or analysis of how these rights are to be protected by the terms of the 
Directive. The Commission acknowledges potential implications for one specific 
human right – freedom of movement – in reference to the new offence of travelling 
abroad for terrorist purposes. An attempt to establish proportionality is made in this 
case and a Directive governing freedom of movement and residence,
115
 including 
allowing for restrictions on those freedoms, is offered as some form of legislative 
precedent. But once again, there is no real engagement with counter-arguments. 
Criminalising travel for terrorism purposes, even between Member States and thus 
within the zone of freedom of movement of the European Union, is required to give 
effect to Resolution 2178 and the Additional Protocol; if proportionality and respect 
for rights is required, and criminalisation is required, then bureaucratic logic 
suggests—and the Explanatory Memorandum suggests—that criminalisation must be 
proportionate. Without rigorous processes that structure and enable dissent and 
disagreement, the lack of rigour that underpins such an analysis cannot easily be 
exposed. The outcome, in other words, is more or less predetermined, even though the 
original instrument—Resolution 2178—was concluded without effective regard for 
rights.  
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Even if, as in the Directive, there is a provision for the impact on rights to be 
considered in an ex post facto reporting process,
116
 it is difficult to imagine what 
could be done if that later process concluded that the Directive did in fact lead to 
disproportionate impacts on rights in respect of the offences underpinned by 
Resolution 2178. Those criminal offences would still be required, and the Resolution 
itself would offer no pathway to resolving the inconsistency with fundamental rights 
protection. While it is true that Resolution 2178 includes some general statements of 
commitments to rights in its preambular provisions and requires states to comply with 
the Resolution in a manner “consistent with international human rights law”,117 
Resolution 1373 on which it builds does not include an obligation to attend to rights, 
and generic statements of regard for rights do little to specify how rights are to be 
protected or to create a benchmark against which rights-based accountability can be 
assured.
118
 While such references to rights perform concern for rights, they do not 
effectively limit state actions that are justified or compelled by the obligations 
imposed in the Resolution. 
 
Neither does the memorandum adequately compensate for the lack of civil society 
engagement in the development of the proposal. Instead of canvasing predictive 
objections of civil society and showing how they have been addressed, the 
Commission’s discussion of consultation is limited to noting the involvement of civil 
society organisations in negotiations within the Council of Europe on the Additional 
Protocol. Although the memorandum acknowledges civil society concerns that the 
Additional Protocol displays “flaws that give rise to the potential to result in arbitrary, 
disproportionate and discriminatory interference with human rights,” it fails to engage 
with the arguments, or with how they might impact on the proposed Directive. In 
other words, the memorandum reports, but does not rigorously rehearse (much less 
counter), the argument that the international instruments on which the Directive was 
based were flawed and, if so, that the European Union was obliged to find a means of 
implementing them that would resolve these rights-related flaws.
119
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 Thus, the provisions designed in depoliticised transnational arenas (the UN Security 
Council and the Council of Europe) were treated as presumptively lawful and 
proportionate, notwithstanding the genuine questions that arise in relation to them. 
The lack of a participative and open process of progressing the Commission’s 
proposal meant that there was no opportunity properly to test the ways in which the 
European Union might be able to address and perhaps resolve these questions.
120
 The 
provisions were compelled by international law and thus treated as presumptively 
constitutional, legal, and proportionate. The Directive will most likely receive the 
same treatment in the domestic legal and political systems in which its transposing 
measures will be developed and passed. The original sins of Resolution 2178 will 
almost certainly find no confessional in domestic parliaments, with the rights-based 
repercussions of a lack of politicisation in the Security Council in New York making 
their way into legislation passed in parliaments from Dublin to Dubrovnik.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It may well be, as other contributors to this special issue argue,
121
 that as a general 
field of activity security is becoming increasingly politicised. If that is the case, and 
provided politicisation is focused to at least some extent on rights and lawfulness, this 
will be welcome from a legal perspective. However, something interesting and 
concerning is happening with counter-terrorism that calls into question the usefulness 
of this politicisation. That is the rapid though fragmented emergence of a 
transnational counter-terrorism space in which, as I have shown here, serious and 
concerning domestic laws may find their ultimate provenance. Where that happens, 
the usefulness of politicisation in domestic systems—even if it does occur—may well 
be minimal, and the ability of the transnational space to structure out the potential for 
politicisation of real domestic legal and political import.  
 
The speed of development, scale of law- and policy-making, and nature of operation 
of the transnational counter-terrorism space is difficult to map. Even the sketch 
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provided here is only partial. Not included, for example, are the bodies—the ‘counter-
terrorism clubs’122—that exist outside of the formal structures of international 
organisations but are clearly designed to be norm entrepreneurs and influencers of 
regional and national entities (such as the Global Counter Terrorism Forum), the 
counter-terrorism initiatives of informal inter-state groupings (such as the G7), and 
the activities of a global counter-terrorism industry that includes legal ‘experts’ 
writing and influencing domestic laws for countries around the world who are 
required (by instruments such as Resolution 2178) to implement such legislation, but 
which have little relevant domestic expertise because they do not have any empirical 
need for such laws based on the nature of the security risks they face.  
 
Counter-terrorism law and policy is increasingly being made in complex, 
transnational venues and moving through transnational spaces to have serious legal 
impacts at domestic and regional levels. In this, it is increasingly beginning to 
resemble the transnational legal orders that lawyers, regulatory theorists, governance 
scholars and political scientists have long been concerned with;
123
 orders that are 
multi-level, operate on a mix of formal and informal delegation, and pose challenges 
to our commitments to accountability within the contemporary state.
124
 When it 
comes to counter-terrorism these challenges have a particular shape, not least because 
of the ways in which security laws impact on rights, and formal accountability 
mechanisms such as courts often struggle to resist strong security narratives advanced 
by states to justify these societal impacts. The analysis presented here suggests that 
within that transnational counter-terrorism space there is a lack of politicisation that, 
where it arises in one venue, can have serious implications in others. If that is right, 
then there is much for political scientists and for lawyers who care about law, rights, 
and the role of politics in securing legality and constitutionalism to be anxious about, 
and a clear need for us to attend to the connections, norm-movements, influences and 
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depoliticising manoeuvres that occur within, and are enabled by, the growing 
transnational counter-terrorism space.  
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